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This paper shows, using data from the Family Income and Expenditure Survey, that 
housing credit has become increasingly available over time in Japan, especially since 
2000, and that this has made it easier for Japanese households to purchase housing and 
enabled them to do so at an earlier age. However, it also shows that the greater availability 
of housing credit has increased households’ housing loan repayment burden, which has 
resulted in their cutting back on their other consumption expenditures and created the 
potential for retirement insecurity. Another concern is that the increasing availability of 
housing credit has been accompanied by a pronounced shift from fixed-rate to variable-
rate housing loans. This is cause for concern given the low level of financial literacy that 
prevails among the Japanese population and the likelihood that interest rates on variable-
rate housing loans will be raised sooner or later as monetary policy is tightened. 
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Financial sector development (in particular, the expansion of housing credit) is generally 
regarded as being a good thing because it relaxes the borrowing constraints facing 
households, makes it easier for them to purchase housing and enabling them to purchase 
housing at a younger age. However, the overexpansion of housing credit can cause serious 
problems for individual households as well as for the economy as a whole.  
 
The best example of this is the subprime mortgage crisis that occurred in the United States 
(US) in 2007-10. Starting in the late 1990s, financial institutions in the US greatly 
expanded their supply of subprime mortgages (housing loans to borrowers with low credit 
ratings that typically charged a fixed interest rate for an initial period and a variable 
interest rate thereafter). The overuse of subprime mortgages caused a surge in defaults 
and foreclosures, which triggered the financial crisis of 2007–08 and the 
subsequent Great Recession (2007–09) (see, for example, Dynan and Kohn (2007), 
Gerardi et al. (2008), Sanders (2008), and Whalen (2008)).１ In addition, Lusardi et al. 
(2018a, 2018b, forthcoming) have documented how the overexpansion of housing credit 
and other forms of consumer credit has created a situation in which many Americans are 
approaching retirement with significant amounts of debt, threatening their retirement 
security. 
 
There has been a similar expansion of housing credit in Japan, particularly since 2000. It 
is of interest to know whether or not it caused, or can be expected to cause, a crisis akin 
to the subprime mortgage crisis in the US. The purpose of this paper is to shed light on 
the extent of the expansion of housing credit in Japan and on the possible impacts of this 
expansion on the financial well-being of households using data from the Family Income 
and Expenditure Survey, a household survey conducted by the Japanese government. The 
ultimate objective of the paper is to assess whether the expansion of housing credit was a 
good thing or a bad thing. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first detailed analysis 
of this issue for the case of Japan although Horioka and Niimi (forthcoming) conducted 
a preliminary analysis using only stock data on liabilities. 
 
１ A comprehensive analysis of the causes of the subprime mortgage crisis in the US is beyond the 
scope of this paper, but the consensus is that it was caused not only by the sharp increase in the supply 
of housing debt to risky borrowers but also by the increase in housing speculation including increased 
purchases of secondary homes for investment purposes, the collapse of the housing bubble, and 
inadequate government regulation of financial products such as mortgage-backed securities and 
collateralized debt obligations that distributed and perhaps concealed the risk of mortgage default 






The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a history of 
housing credit in Japan; section 3 discusses the data used for the analysis; section 4 
documents the rapid growth in the availability of housing credit in Japan after 2000; 
sections 5 and 6 present evidence on the benefits and costs of the increasing availability 
of housing credit, respectively; and section 7 summarizes, concludes, and explores the 
policy implications of our findings. 
 
2. The History of Housing Credit in Japan 
 
The Second World War caused the destruction of a substantial fraction of Japan’s housing 
stock, and as a result, housing conditions were poor and the homeownership rate was low 
at the end of the war. One of the policies that the Japanese government adopted to remedy 
this situation was to establish in 1950 the Government Housing Loan Corporation (GHLC, 
in Japanese, Juutaku Kin’yuu Kouko), a government agency similar to the Federal 
Housing Authority in the US, whose purpose was to provide long-term fixed- and low-
interest rate loans to households wishing to purchase or construct housing. In the early 
postwar years, the GHLC was the primary source of housing loans, but private financial 
institutions began offering housing loans in the 1970s and 1980s. Moreover, in 1994, the 
Ministry of Finance liberalized the housing loan market and allowed private financial 
institutions to freely set the terms and interest rates of housing loans. This led to an 
expansion in the amount of housing credit provided by private financial institutions, and 
it came to be felt that there was no longer a need for the government to supply housing 
credit. 
 
It was therefore decided in 2001 that the GHLC would be abolished as part of the reform 
of special public corporations, and in 2003, a law governing the restructuring of the 
GHLC was passed that provided for the abolition of the GHLC in 2007 and its 
replacement by the newly created Japan Housing Finance Agency (JHF, in Japanese, 
Juutaku Kin’yuu Shien Kikou). At the same time, it was decided that the GHLC would 
scale back its provision of housing loans and shift its focus to securitizing and 
guaranteeing private-sector housing loans. The GHLC started its securitization operations 
in 2003, and these operations were taken over by the JHF following the abolition of the 
GHLC in 2007.  
 





directly to households, the JHF’s primary role is to help private financial institutions to 
provide housing loans by securitizing and guaranteeing a type of long-term fixed-rate 
housing loan offered by private financial institutions called Flat 35 (a fixed-rate housing 
loan with a maturity of 35 years). More specifically, the JHF purchases such housing 
loans from private financial institutions, issues mortgage-backed securities, and 
guarantees that investors in these securities will receive payment of the principal and 
interest on schedule. The government decided to assume the role of securitizing and 
guaranteeing private housing loans because, although the securitization of housing loans 
started in 1999, the securitization market for private label securities was too small to 
replace GHLC lending.  
 
The end result of these reforms is that the housing finance system was greatly liberalized, 
with the role of the private sector expanding relative to that of the government sector and 
with the choices available to households broadening to include not only fixed-rate loans 
but also variable-rate loans and elective-period fixed rate loans, a hybrid product whose 
interest rate is fixed for a pre-determined number of years before becoming variable. 
Figure 1, for example, shows the shares of various types of housing loans in the case of 
new lending during the 2001-16 period. One of the most noticeable trends in this figure 
is a significant increase in the share of variable-rate loans since the mid-2000s. Its share 
was only about 23% in 2001 but increased to about 50% in 2016.  
 
Moreover, other factors also contributed to the expansion of housing credit such as the 
decline in corporate borrowing and the need for lenders to find alternate borrowers for 
their funds.２ 
 
To summarize, recent reforms of the housing credit system have not only increased the 
supply of housing credit available to households but have also increased the choices 
available to them. In conjunction with the low interest rates that have prevailed in recent 
years, these reforms have made it easier for households to purchase a home (see 




２ Note that, in addition to factors increasing the supply of housing credit, there were also factors 
increasing the demand for housing credit. For example, Yukutake et al. (2015) suggest that inter vivos 
transfers from parents to children may have become more exchange-related (i.e., tied to care of elderly 
parents) over time, which in turn may have made children more hesitant to rely on parents for financial 







The data we use in this paper are taken from the Family Income and Expenditure Survey 
(FIES). This survey, the Japanese equivalent of the US Consumer Expenditure Survey, is 
a household survey conducted on an ongoing basis by the Statistics Bureau, Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and Communications. It collects extensive information on household 
income, consumption, saving, wealth, and liabilities. About 8,000 households are 
randomly selected from throughout Japan using a three-stage stratified sampling method, 
and thus the sample of the FIES is representative of the entire population of Japan. 
 
Until 2001, stock data on wealth and liabilities were collected separately in a companion 
survey called the Family Savings Survey (FSS), and thus, until 2001, stock data on wealth 
and liabilities are taken from this source. The FSS was fully incorporated into the FIES 
in 2002, and the data for 2001 and earlier and those for 2002 and later are fully comparable. 
 
These surveys collect data on all households, but in this analysis, we present data only on 
salaried worker households (households in which the household head is a salaried worker) 
because data on income and saving are not available for other households (primarily self-
employed, unemployed, and retired households). Moreover, we confine our sample to 
two-or-more-person households due to data limitations. 
 
4. The Expansion of Housing Credit in Japan 
 
The liberalization of the housing loan market that has taken place since the 1990s is likely 
to have resulted in the increasing availability of housing credit over time, as noted earlier. 
To confirm this trend, we look at stock data on the ratio of housing-related debt to 
household disposable income. Note that, in this section as well as throughout the 
remainder of this paper, we present data on the full sample of two-or-more-person salaried 
worker households of all ages as well as on such households with a head aged 30-39, 40-
49, and 50-59 for selected years during the 1970-2017 period.３ 
 
 
３ We do not show data on households with a head aged 29 or younger because the number of 
observations is too small to be reliable. We do not show data on households with a head aged 60 or 
older either because the compulsory retirement age for salaried workers in Japan has traditionally been 
60, meaning that the vast majority of those aged 60 or older are already retired and, as a result, the 
number of observations with a head aged 60 or older in our sample (i.e., the sample of salaried worker 





Table 1 shows stock data on the ratio of housing-related debt to household disposable 
income for the 1970-2017 period.４ As can be seen from this table, this ratio was a mere 
11 to 14% in 1970, but it increased sharply for all age groups during the 1970-2017 period. 
The increase was especially pronounced for the 30-39 age group, increasing by 4.85 
percentage points per year, on average, for this age group as opposed to 2.77 percentage 
points for the full sample, 3.45 percentage points for the 40-49 age group, and 1.74 
percentage points for the 50-59 age group.  
 
Looking in more detail at trends over time, the rate of increase in the housing debt-to-
income ratio was roughly constant throughout the 1970-2017 period for the full sample, 
averaging 2.68 percentage points per year during the 1970-2000 period and 2.91 
percentage points during the 2000-17 period. However, we find that the rate of increase 
in the housing debt-to-income ratio varied greatly over time if we look at trends by age 
group. For example, in the case of the 30-39 age group, the housing debt-to-income ratio 
increased by 3.07 percentage points per year, on average, during the 1970-2000 period 
but by 7.98 percentage points during the 2000-17 period. By contrast, it increased by 3.96 
(2.05) percentage points per year during the 1970-2000 period but by 2.55 (1.19) 
percentage points during the 2000-17 period for the 40-49 (50-59) age group. Thus, the 
increase in the housing debt-to-income ratio accelerated after 2000 in the 30-39 age group 
but decelerated after 2000 in the 40-49 and 50-59 age groups. This suggests not only that 
the availability of housing credit increased rapidly over time but that it became available 
to younger and younger households over time.  
 
5. The Benefits of the Increasing Availability of Housing Credit in Japan 
 
In the previous section, we provided evidence that housing credit has become increasingly 
available especially after 2000 and especially for the 30-39 age group. In this section, we 
attempt to shed light on what impact the increasing availability of housing credit has had 
on household behavior. One possibility is that the increasing availability of housing credit 
has allowed households to purchase housing with a smaller down payment, making it 
easier for households to purchase housing and enabling them to do so at an earlier age 
than previously. We present three types of evidence in support of this working hypothesis. 
 
Table 2 shows flow data on the ratio of new housing loans to housing purchases 
(commonly referred to as the loan-to-value ratio), which indicates the proportion of 
 





housing purchases financed by housing loans, or to put it another way, one minus the 
down payment ratio. As can be seen from this table, the loan-to-value ratio was only about 
11 to about 43% for all age groups in 1970 but increased sharply thereafter (except for a 
few outliers for the 40-49 and 50-59 age groups, which are presumably due to the small 
number of households purchasing a new house). For example, it increased from about 37 
to about 72% for the full sample and from about 43 to 85% for the 30-39 age group. These 
figures imply that the down payment ratio decreased sharply from about 63 to about 28% 
for the full sample and from about 57 to about 15% for the 30-39 age group.  
 
Looking in more detail at trends over time, the rate of increase in the loan-to-value ratio 
(the decrease in the down payment ratio) accelerated after 2000 for both the full sample 
and the 30-39 age group. The rate of increase averaged 0.51 (0.07) percentage points per 
year during the 1970-2000 period but accelerated to 1.19 (2.35) percentage points during 
the 2000-17 period for the full sample (the 30-39 age group). These figures provide 
further corroboration that housing credit became much more available during this period, 
especially after 2000 and especially for the 30-39 age group, and suggest that the amount 
of down payment required for purchasing housing has been declining over time.  
 
We look next at stock data on the homeownership rate (Table 3) and flow data on the ratio 
of housing purchases to household disposable income (Table 4). Table 3 presents data on 
the homeownership rate for the 1975-2017 period (data were not available for 1970). 
According to this table, the homeownership rate increased sharply during this period for 
all age groups (with the exception of the 1975-95 period in the case of the 30-39 age 
group), from about 56 to about 79% for the full sample, from about 48 to about 62% for 
the 30-39 age group, from about 65 to about 79% for the 40-49 age group, and from about 
76 to about 87% for the 50-59 age group. These figures suggest that the government’s 
efforts to improve the housing conditions of the Japanese population have been effective, 
at least to some extent. 
 
Looking in more detail at trends over time, the rate of increase in the homeownership rate 
was roughly constant throughout the 1975-2017 period for the full sample, averaging 0.48 
percentage points per year during the 1975-2000 period and 0.62 percentage points during 
the 2000-17 period. However, trends over time varied greatly by age group. The 
homeownership rate of the 30-39 age group decreased by 0.15 percentage points per year, 
on average, during the 1970-2000 period, but it increased by 1.06 percentage points 





group increased by 0.44 (0.37) percentage points per year during the 1970-2000 period, 
but the rate of increase decelerated to 0.21 (0.14) percentage points during the 2000-17 
period. 
 
As a result, the rate of increase in the homeownership rate was much higher for the 40-
49 and 50-59 age groups than for the 30-39 age group during the 1970-2000 period, 
whereas the opposite was the case during the 2000-17 period. Note also the fact that the 
homeownership rate increased more rapidly for the 30-39 age group than for the 40-49 
and 50-59 age groups during the 2000-17 period dramatically decreased the gap in the 
homeownership rate between these age groups. The homeownership rate of the 30-39 age 
group was 31.4 (40.4) percentage points lower than that of the 40-49 (50-59) age group 
in 2000, but this gap had narrowed by almost half to 16.9 (24.8) percentage points by 
2017. 
 
Turning next to data on housing purchases as a ratio of household disposable income, 
Table 4 shows data on this ratio for the 1970-2017 period. The housing purchases-to-
income ratio was in the 1.6 to 2.9% range for all age groups in 1970 and showed little 
variation by age, but subsequent trends in this ratio vary greatly by age group. It declined 
during the 1970-2017 period by 0.01 percentage points per year, on average, for the full 
sample, by 0.02 percentage points for the 40-49 age group, and by 0.06 percentage points 
for the 50-59 age group, but it increased by 0.11 percentage points for the 30-39 age group. 
Moreover, the rate of increase of this ratio for the 30-39 age group accelerated sharply 
over time from 0.04 percentage points per year during the 1970-2000 period to 0.22 
percentage points during the 2000-17 period. 
 
As a result, in 2017, the housing purchases-to-income ratio was by far the highest for the 
30-39 age group (7.5%), much higher than for the 40-49 age group (0.5%) and the 50-59 
age group (0.3%). This trend, together with the trend in homeownership rates shown in 
Table 3, suggests that housing purchases have become increasingly concentrated in the 
30-39 age group over time. 
 
Further corroboration of the trend toward purchasing housing at a younger age is provided 
by Table 5. The table shows data on the life-cycle pattern of the housing debt-to-income 
ratio by birth cohort and is based on the information contained in Table 1. According to 
this table, the housing debt-to-income ratio increases with age for birth cohorts born in 





later. This change occurred because younger birth cohorts were able to purchase housing 
at a younger age than older birth cohorts, meaning that they could repay their housing 
loans and reduce their outstanding housing debt sooner.   
  
All of these findings corroborate the working hypothesis we proposed at the beginning of 
this section that the increasing availability of housing credit has made it easier for 
households to purchase housing and has enabled them to do so at an earlier age (in their 
30s) than previously. 
 
Needless to say, however, the increase in housing purchases in the 30-39 age group after 
2000 was not due entirely to the increasing availability of housing credit. There were 
other contributing factors, and we briefly discuss each of these factors in turn. 
 
(1) Tax breaks for housing purchase. The Japanese government has offered various tax 
breaks for housing purchase since 1978, partly to promote homeownership and partly 
to stimulate the economy as a whole. These tax breaks have typically taken the form 
of tax deductions that are calculated as a certain percentage (currently 1%) of the 
outstanding value of housing loans and that are available for a certain number of years 
(formerly 10 years but extended to 13 years on October 1, 2019, to coincide with the 
consumption tax increase) if certain conditions are met. Given that these tax breaks 
for housing purchase have been repeatedly expanded, they are likely to have promoted 
housing purchases as well as the use of housing loans to finance these purchases. 
 
(2) Monetary policy. The Bank of Japan has maintained an expansionary monetary 
policy since at least September 1995, and in particular, it has pursued a so-called ‘zero 
interest rate policy’ since February 1999 (except during the August 2000 to March 
2001 period). This led to a sharp decline in all interest rates, and interest rates on 
housing loans were no exception. Moreover, the Bank of Japan has pursued 
quantitative easing policies since 2001 and quantitative and qualitative easing policies 
since 2013, and this has increased the supply of credit, including housing credit. The 
decline in interest rates and the increased supply of credit are likely to have promoted 
housing purchases as well as the use of housing loans to finance these purchases. 
 
(3) The reduction in company housing and rent subsidies. In the past, large Japanese 
companies provided low-cost company housing and/or rent subsidies to their 





scaling back such fringe benefits in recent years. For example, a survey by Keidanren 
(Japan Business Federation) found that the housing-related subsidies of large 
companies peaked in 1996 and have been steadily declining since 2000.５   
 
(4) The decline in the construction of public housing. One pillar of the Japanese 
government’s housing policy during the postwar period (together with subsidized 
housing loans) was the provision of public housing, largely to the low- and middle-
income and the elderly. However, the construction of public housing has largely been 
curtailed since the 1990s, and this may have contributed to the increase in housing 
purchases in recent years (see, for example, Xu and Zhou (2019)).  
 
(5) The decline in land prices. Real land prices in Japan rose sharply in the late 1980s, 
but they have been declining steadily since 1992, and the decline in land prices 
undoubtedly contributed to the increase in housing purchases by making housing 
more affordable (see Horioka and Niimi (2020) for data on trends in land prices over 
time).６ 
 
(6) The trend toward nuclear families. The social norm in Japan has traditionally been 
for children (especially the eldest son) to continue living with their parents even after 
they marry and have children and to care for elderly parents. However, there has been 
a steady increase in the share of nuclear families in recent decades (see, for example, 
Niimi (2016)), and this trend may have increased the need for the younger generation 
to secure its own housing, thereby contributing to the increase in housing purchases. 
 
In sum, all of these factors have undoubtedly played some role in encouraging households 
to purchase housing and to finance their purchases using housing loans and in 
encouraging them to do so at an earlier age since 2000. A rigorous analysis is needed to 
determine the contribution of each of these factors to the recent increase in housing 




５ Refer to Keizai Dantai Rengoukai (Keidanren) (Japan Business Federation), Dai-62-kai Fukuri 
Kousei-hi Chousa Kekka Houkoku (62nd Report on the Results of the Employee Benefits Survey) (Fiscal 
Year 2017), December 19, 2018 (available at https://www.keidanren.or.jp/policy/2018/115.html). 
６  Note, however, that Nemoto (2017) finds that land prices are significantly affected by credit 
availability, which suggests that land prices are endogenous and that the increased availability of 





6. The Costs of the Increasing Availability of Housing Credit in Japan 
 
We have so far shown that the increasing availability of housing credit has been beneficial 
to households, making it easier for them to purchase housing and enabling them to do so 
at an earlier age than previously. However, we now wish to consider whether the 
increasing availability of housing credit has imposed any offsetting costs on households. 
One possibility is that increased purchases of housing at younger ages has increased the 
debt burden of households and reduced their standard of living. 
 
In order to test this hypothesis, Table 6 shows data on the ratio of housing loan repayments 
to household disposable income (hereafter called the housing loan repayment burden) 
during the 1970-2017 period. This ratio was only 0.8 to 1.4% in 1970, but it has shown 
an upward trend since then for all age groups, increasing from 1.2% to 8.3% for the full 
sample, from 1.4 to 9.5% for the 30-39 age group, from 1.3 to 10.0% for the 40-49 age 
group, and from 0.8 to 8.0% for the 50-59 age group.  
 
Looking in more detail at trends over time, during the 1970-2000 period, the rate of 
increase of the housing loan repayment burden was highest for the 40-49 age group (0.29 
percentage points per year, on average, as opposed to 0.21 percentage points for the full 
sample and 0.20 (0.18) percentage points for the 30-39 (50-59) age group), but during the 
2000-17 period, it was highest for the 30-39 age group (0.12 percentage points per year 
as opposed to 0.06 percentage points for the full sample and -0.01 (0.10) percentage points 
for the 40-49 (50-59) age group). The fact that the housing loan repayment burden 
increased most rapidly for the 40-49 age group during the 1970-2000 period but increased 
most rapidly for the 30-39 age group during the 2000-17 period reflects the decline in the 
average age of housing purchase over time. 
 
Our finding that the housing loan repayment burden increased for all age groups during 
the 1970-2017 period, presumably as a result of increased housing purchases, suggests 
that households may have had to reduce their propensity to consume by the same extent. 
However, it must be borne in mind that homeowner households do not need to pay rent 
and that this benefit of homeownership at least partially offsets the burden of housing 
loan repayments and other expenses associated with homeownership. Hence, households’ 
standard of living will not necessarily deteriorate as a result of increased housing 






In order to test this assertion, we need to examine data on the ratio of rent to disposable 
income, which are shown in Table 7 for the 1970-2017 period. The rent-to-income ratio 
was relatively low for all age groups in 1970 (about 1.2 to 3.5%) but was somewhat higher 
for the 30-39 age group than for the 40-49 and 50-59 age groups. This can, at least partly, 
be explained by the fact that the homeownership rate was much lower for the 30-39 group, 
as shown in Table 3. The rent-to-income ratio subsequently showed an upward trend from 
1975 until 2005-10 for all age groups (even though the homeownership ratio increased 
for all age groups except for the 30-39 age group (see Table 3)), presumably because rent 
levels increased during this period. However, the rent-to-income ratio tapered off after 
2005-2010 for all age groups. This change in trend is particularly pronounced for the 30-
39 age group, for which the rate of change in the rent-to-income ratio was negative (-0.08 
percentage points per year, on average) during the 2000-17 period. As shown earlier, the 
homeownership rate of the 30-39 age group increased sharply during this period, 
suggesting that the decreased rent burden was caused by the increase in homeownership. 
These findings suggest that households’ standard of living may not necessarily have 
deteriorated due to the increased burden of housing loan repayments inasmuch as 
households no longer need to pay rent after purchasing housing. 
 
In order to ascertain the extent to which the decline in rent payments has offset the 
increase in the housing loan repayment burden, we look next at data on the ratio of total 
housing-related expenditures (the sum of housing loan repayments and rent) to household 
disposable income for the 1970-2017 period (see Table 8). The housing-related-
expenditure-to-income ratio was relatively low for all age groups in 1970 (between 2.0% 
and 4.8%), but this ratio then showed a sharp upward trend in all age groups, increasing 
to the 9.8-14.5% range in 2017. This suggests that the increased burden of housing loan 
repayments has not been fully offset by the reduced rent burden.  
 
This, in turn, raises the question of whether the sharp increase in the total burden of 
housing-related expenditures required households, especially households in the 30-39 age 
group, to reduce their non-housing consumption. We therefore look at data on the non-
housing consumption propensity (calculated as the ratio of household consumption 
excluding rent to household disposable income) for the 1970-2017 period (see Table 9). 
As can be seen from this table, this ratio was relatively high and almost identical (about 
77%) in all age groups in 1970, but it declined for all age groups thereafter. Moreover, it 
declined much more sharply for the 30-39 age group than for older age groups, and as a 





(59.0% vs. 64.1% for the 40-49 age group and 73.0% for the 50-59 age group). Thus, the 
increasing burden of housing-related expenditures required all households but especially 
households in the 30-39 age group to reduce their non-housing consumption. In the case 
of the 30-39 age group, the increase in the housing-related-expenditure-to-income ratio 
was 9.7 percentage points during the 1970-2017 period (see Table 8), while the decrease 
in the non-housing consumption propensity during the same period was 18.1 percentage 
points (see Table 9). Thus, the increase in the burden of housing-related expenditures can 
explain more than half of the decrease in non-housing consumption. 
 
Another cause for concern is that Japanese households will not be able to accumulate 
enough assets for retirement due to the excessive burden of housing loan repayments. To 
investigate this possibility, we look at data on the ratio of financial assets net of non-
housing liabilities to household disposable income. We focus on financial assets rather 
than total assets because Japanese households typically continue living in their own 
homes after retirement, meaning that only financial assets can be used to finance their 
living expenses during retirement. Table 10 shows data on the so-called net financial asset 
ratio for the 1970-2017 period. This ratio increased throughout this period for the full 
sample and for the 50-59 age group but peaked in 1990-2005 (2000-05) for the 30-39 (40-
49) age group. Since the increase in the housing loan repayment burden after 2000 was 
highest for the 30-39 age group, it is quite possible that the tapering off of the net financial 
asset ratio after 2000 for this age group was due, at least in part, to the increase in its 
housing loan repayment burden (see Table 6).  
 
To corroborate this hypothesis further, we show in Table 11 data on the life-cycle pattern 
of the net financial asset ratio by birth cohort, which is based on the information contained 
in Table 10. We find that the net financial asset ratio increases with age for all birth cohorts 
but that the rate of the increase has declined over time in recent years. For example, the 
increase in the net financial asset ratio from the 30-39 age group to the 40-49 age group 
was about 64 percentage points for the 1946-55 birth cohort but only about 36 percentage 
points for the 1966-75 birth cohort. Since the former figure pertains to the 1985-95 period 
while the latter figure pertains to the 2005-2015 period, the flattening in the age profile 
of the net financial asset ratio from cohort to cohort is presumably due, at least in part, to 
the increasing housing loan repayment burden after 2000.  
 
There is therefore a possibility that, as a result of their increasing housing loan repayment 





resources to finance their living expenses during retirement. However, it must be borne 
in mind that homeowners have an important advantage vis-à-vis renters (namely, that they 
do not need to pay rent), as a result of which they do not need as much wealth to finance 
their living expenses during retirement. 
 
Yet another cause for concern is that the increasing availability of housing credit over the 
last few decades has been accompanied by a significant shift from fixed-rate to variable-
rate housing loans (see Figure 1). As long as interest rates are kept low, this should not be 
a serious concern, but the Bank of Japan is likely to normalize its monetary policy sooner 
or later, and when it does so, interest rates on variable-rate housing loans will increase. 
Moreover, given that interest rates have been kept low for so long in Japan and given the 
low levels of financial literacy of Japanese households, many Japanese households may 
not be fully aware of the risks associated with variable-rate housing loans. 
 
Figure 2, for example, shows that about 12% of those who have taken out variable-rate 
housing loans do not seem to understand the implications of interest rate increases for 
loan repayment amounts. In addition, about 37% of them are worried about whether or 
not they understand this risk sufficiently. This suggests that Japan may see a group of 
households who encounter difficulties in repaying their housing loans if and when interest 
rates are increased. It is indeed worrying to find that about one-fifth of those who have 
taken out variable-rate housing loans do not seem to have thought about possible ways of 
responding to the increase in the loan repayment amount that will occur if and when 
interest rates increase and that about 10% of such households plan to refinance when 
interest rates increase, which is the opposite of what they should do (see Figure 3). 
 
7. Summary, Conclusions, and Policy Implications  
 
There has been a rapid expansion of housing credit in Japan especially since 2000, and it 
is of interest to know whether or not it caused, or can be expected to cause, a crisis akin 
to the subprime mortgage crisis in the US. This paper tried to shed light on the extent of 
the expansion of housing credit in Japan and on the possible impacts of this expansion on 
the financial well-being of households using data from the Family Income and 
Expenditure Survey. The ultimate objective of the paper was to assess whether the 
expansion of housing credit was a good thing or a bad thing. 
 





available over time in Japan, especially since 2000, and that this has made it easier for 
Japanese households to purchase housing and has enabled them to do so at an earlier age, 
which in turn has freed them from the burden of having to pay rent. On the other hand, 
this has increased households’ housing loan repayment burden and required them to cut 
back on their other consumption expenditures and created the potential for retirement 
insecurity. Furthermore, we showed that the increasing availability of housing credit has 
been accompanied by a significant shift from fixed-rate to variable-rate housing loans. 
This is cause for concern given the low level of financial literacy that prevails among the 
Japanese population and the likelihood that interest rates on variable-rate housing loans 
will be raised sooner or later as monetary policy is tightened. 
 
The rapid expansion of housing credit in Japan therefore has not produced a crisis as it 
did in the US, at least not yet, but there is still cause for concern. At the very least, the 
government should monitor the debt levels and housing loan repayment burdens of 
households and provide them with adequate financial literacy so that they fully appreciate 
the risks inherent in variable-rate housing mortgages. Moreover, the government should 
monitor the situation with particular vigilance if and when the Bank of Japan normalizes 
its monetary policy because households have become more vulnerable to rising interest 
rates as the share of households who have chosen variable-rate housing loans has 
increased sharply in recent years. 
 
Turning finally to the question we posed in the title of our paper “Was the expansion of 
housing credit in Japan good or bad?” we showed that it conferred considerable 
advantages on Japanese households such as making it easier for them to purchase housing 
and enabling them to do so at an earlier age, which in turn has freed them from the burden 
of having to pay rent, and these are significant advantages given Japanese households’ 
strong preference for homeownership. The rapid expansion of housing credit has, at the 
same time, conferred disadvantages on Japanese households such as increasing their 
housing loan repayment burden, requiring them to cut back on their other consumption 
expenditures, and creating the potential for retirement insecurity, but none of these 
disadvantages appears to be very serious, at least at the present time. Thus, we believe 
that the advantages conferred by the rapid expansion of housing credit greatly offset the 
disadvantages thereof and that the answer to our question is an unqualified “yes.” At the 
same time, however, we wish to reiterate our view that the impact of housing credit on 
households needs to be monitored closely to prevent the occurrence of a housing loan 
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Year Full sample 30-39 40-49 50-59
age group age group age group
1970 11.7 11.2 14.3 11.1
1975 23.2 27.1 26.1 20.1
1980 37.5 43.1 42.7 28.8
1985 51.6 62.9 58.3 40.2
1990 58.4 63.7 73.0 45.5
1995 72.4 86.1 80.9 60.4
2000 92.2 103.3 133.0 72.7
2005 106.0 140.4 134.7 78.1
2010 121.9 171.8 154.2 84.1
2015 136.1 200.7 183.0 92.7
2017 141.8 239.0 176.3 92.9
1970-2000 2.68 3.07 3.96 2.05
2000-2017 2.91 7.98 2.55 1.19
1970-2017 2.77 4.85 3.45 1.74
Table 1: Ratio of Housing-related Liabilities to Household Disposable Income
(percent)
Average change per year (percentage points)
Notes: The figures show the ratio of housing-related liabilities to household
disposable income (percent).
Source: Family and Income Expenditure Survey, conducted by the Statistics Bureau,







Year Full sample 30-39 40-49 50-59
age group age group age group
1970 36.9 43.3 37.2 11.0
1975 29.4 32.7 41.8 7.8
1980 39.6 39.5 46.9 15.6
1985 50.7 56.4 52.5 42.7
1990 44.1 55.1 22.1 72.1
1995 65.4 69.9 57.6 66.4
2000 52.1 45.3 47.0 52.9
2005 44.7 65.7 36.3 11.7
2010 56.9 73.5 0.6 33.4
2015 83.4 80.7 89.9 81.8
2017 72.4 85.2 52.6 15.7
1970-2000 0.51 0.07 0.32 1.40
2000-2017 1.19 2.35 0.33 -2.19
1970-2017 0.76 0.89 0.33 0.10
Table 2: Loan-to-Value Ratio (percent)
Average change per year (percentage points)
Notes: The figures show the loan-to-value ratio, defined as the ratio of new housing
loans to land/housing purchases (percent).
Source: Family and Income Expenditure Survey, conducted by the Statistics Bureau,
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Government of Japan  
 
Year Full sample 30-39 40-49 50-59
age group age group age group
1975 56.4 47.9 64.6 75.5
1980 61.2 48.9 70.3 83.4
1985 65.0 46.9 73.8 85.8
1990 66.0 42.4 73.7 81.4
1995 64.1 39.1 67.8 82.0
2000 68.5 44.2 75.6 84.6
2005 68.8 46.2 72.3 84.2
2010 71.2 51.8 73.8 83.7
2015 76.0 58.3 77.1 85.1
2017 79.0 62.2 79.1 87.0
1975-2000 0.48 -0.15 0.44 0.37
2000-2017 0.62 1.06 0.21 0.14
1975-2017 0.54 0.34 0.35 0.27
Table 3: Homeownership Rate (percent)
Average change per year (percentage points)
Notes: The figures show the homeownership rate (percent).
Source: Family and Income Expenditure Survey, conducted by the Statistics






Year Full sample 30-39 40-49 50-59
age group age group age group
1970 2.2 2.5 1.6 2.9
1975 3.4 4.0 2.5 3.8
1980 3.9 4.7 5.3 1.8
1985 3.3 3.3 3.4 2.5
1990 2.3 2.9 2.3 2.1
1995 4.4 6.9 4.9 3.1
2000 2.9 3.7 2.0 3.0
2005 3.2 1.9 2.4 3.0
2010 1.9 6.4 0.5 0.9
2015 2.8 7.5 2.6 1.8
2017 1.8 7.5 0.5 0.3
1970-2000 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.00
2000-2017 -0.06 0.22 -0.09 -0.16
1970-2017 -0.01 0.11 -0.02 -0.06
Table 4: Ratio of Land/Housing Purchases to Household Disposable Income
(percent)
Average change per year (percentage points)
Notes: The figures show the ratio of land/housing purchases to household disposable
income (percent).
Source: Family and Income Expenditure Survey, conducted by the Statistics Bureau,





1936-45 27.1 58.3 60.4
1946-55 62.9 80.9 78.1
1956-65 86.1 134.7 92.7
1966-75 140.4 183.0
1976-85 200.7
Table 5: Ratio of Housing-related Liabilities to Household
Disposable Income by Birth Cohort (percent)
Age group
Birth years of cohort
Notes: The figures show the ratio of housing-related liabilities
to household disposable income (percent).






Year Full sample 30-39 40-49 50-59
age group age group age group
1970 1.2 1.4 1.3 0.8
1975 2.1 2.4 2.5 1.4
1980 3.9 3.9 5.0 3.3
1985 5.4 5.3 6.5 5.0
1990 5.2 4.6 6.7 5.0
1995 6.1 5.8 7.3 6.2
2000 7.3 7.4 10.1 6.3
2005 7.4 7.9 9.2 6.7
2010 8.8 8.7 10.9 8.6
2015 8.7 9.6 10.7 8.2
2017 8.3 9.5 10.0 8.0
1970-2000 0.21 0.20 0.29 0.18
2000-2017 0.06 0.12 -0.01 0.10
1970-2017 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.15
Table 6: Ratio of Housing Loan Repayments to Household Disposable Income
(percent)
Average change per year (percentage points)
Notes: The figures show the ratio of housing loan repayments to household disposable
income (percent).
Source: Family and Income Expenditure Survey, conducted by the Statistics Bureau,






Year Full sample 30-39 40-49 50-59
age group age group age group
1970 2.5 3.5 1.4 1.2
1975 2.2 2.7 1.3 1.0
1980 2.3 3.1 1.5 1.0
1985 2.3 3.6 1.5 1.0
1990 2.4 4.2 1.7 1.0
1995 3.2 5.9 2.3 1.5
2000 3.3 6.2 2.2 1.5
2005 3.5 6.5 2.7 1.8
2010 3.3 5.7 2.7 1.9
2015 3.0 5.3 2.6 1.8
2017 2.6 4.9 2.3 1.8
1970-2000 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.01
2000-2017 -0.04 -0.08 0.01 0.01
1970-2017 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.01
Table 7: Ratio of Rent to Household Disposable Income (percent)
Average change per year (percentage points)
Notes: The figures show the ratio of rent to household disposable income (percent).
Source: Family and Income Expenditure Survey, conducted by the Statistics Bureau,
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Government of Japan  
Year Full sample 30-39 40-49 50-59
age group age group age group
1970 3.6 4.8 2.8 2.0
1975 4.3 5.1 3.8 2.4
1980 6.2 6.9 6.5 4.4
1985 7.7 8.9 7.9 6.0
1990 7.6 8.8 8.4 6.0
1995 9.4 11.6 9.6 7.7
2000 10.6 13.7 12.3 7.9
2005 10.9 14.4 11.9 8.5
2010 12.0 14.3 13.6 10.5
2015 11.7 14.9 13.3 9.9
2017 11.0 14.5 12.3 9.8
1970-2000 0.23 0.29 0.32 0.19
2000-2017 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.11
1970-2017 0.16 0.21 0.20 0.16
Table 8: Ratio of Housing-related Expenditures to Household Disposable
Income (percent)
Average change per year (percentage points)
Notes: The figures show the ratio of housing-related expenditures (the sum of rent
and housing loan repayments) to household disposable income (percent).
Source: Family and Income Expenditure Survey, conducted by the Statistics Bureau,





Year Full sample 30-39 40-49 50-59
age group age group age group
1970 77.2 77.1 77.4 76.7
1975 74.9 74.9 74.6 74.3
1980 75.7 74.5 75.9 76.8
1985 75.1 73.1 75.4 76.1
1990 72.8 68.8 74.3 73.9
1995 69.3 62.8 72.4 70.2
2000 68.9 61.5 68.6 71.7
2005 71.2 62.8 69.4 74.2
2010 70.8 62.6 65.7 74.7
2015 73.8 65.7 69.7 74.1
2017 69.4 59.0 64.1 73.0
1970-2000 -0.28 -0.52 -0.29 -0.17
2000-2017 0.03 -0.15 -0.27 0.08
1970-2017 -0.17 -0.39 -0.28 -0.08
Table 9: Non-Housing Consumption Propensity (percent)
Average change per year (percentage points)
Notes: The figures show the ratio of financial assets net of non-housing liabilities
to household disposable income (percent).
Source: Family and Income Expenditure Survey, conducted by the Statistics
Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Government of Japan  
Year Full sample 30-39 40-49 50-59
age group age group age group
1970 97.9 79.2 97.3 135.8
1975 97.3 78.1 97.1 119.6
1980 125.4 98.6 117.4 163.8
1985 150.2 111.2 137.8 179.3
1990 192.8 137.8 166.3 221.4
1995 212.3 136.4 175.0 251.0
2000 229.0 136.4 192.9 256.1
2005 233.7 136.2 192.9 269.7
2010 231.4 122.5 177.1 270.8
2015 244.2 125.5 172.6 276.5
2017 244.0 116.4 175.4 274.7
1970-2000 4.37 1.90 3.18 4.01
2000-2017 0.88 -1.17 -1.03 1.09
1970-2017 3.11 0.79 1.66 2.95
Average change per year (percentage points)
Table 10: Ratio of Net Financial Assets to Household Disposable Income (percent)
Notes: The figures show the ratio of financial assets net of non-housing liabilities to
household disposable income (percent).
Source: Family and Income Expenditure Survey, conducted by the Statistics Bureau, Ministry















1926-35 97.1 179.3 82.1
1936-45 78.1 137.8 251.0 59.7 113.2 172.9
1946-55 111.2 175.0 269.7 63.8 94.7 158.5
1956-65 136.4 192.9 276.5 56.5 83.6 140.1
1966-75 136.2 172.6 36.4
1976-85 125.5
Table 11: Ratio of Net Financial Assets to Household Disposable Income by Birth
Cohort (percent)
Notes: The figures show the ratio of financial assets net of non-housing liabilities to











Figure 1. The share of various types of housing loans in new lending 
 
Source: Housing Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, various years, Results 
Report on the Survey on the Status of Private Housing Loans (Minkan Juutaku Ron no Jittai nikansuru 
Chousa: Kekka Houkokusho) (available at https://www.e-stat.go.jp/stat-
search/files?page=1&toukei=00600670&tstat=000001016940) 
 
Figure 2. The level of understanding about the impact of possible interest rate 
increases on the loan repayment amount 
 
Note: The figures are for those who have taken out variable-rate loans. 
Source: Japan Housing Finance Agency (2019), 2018 Survey on the Status of Private Housing Loan Users 

















2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Whole period fixed-rate loans Securitized loans (Flat 35)
Elective period fixed-rate loans Variable-rate loans
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Fully understand More or less understand
Worried about whether I understand sufficiently Do not understand well





Figure 3. Planned response to the increase in the loan repayment amount in the 
event of interest rate increases 
 
Note: The figures are for those who have taken out variable-rate loans. 
Source: Japan Housing Finance Agency (2019), 2018 Survey on the Status of Private Housing Loan Users 




0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Continue repaying as I have the financial capacity to do so
Repay fully if the interest burden becomes too large
Repay part of the loan early to reduce the interest burden
Refinancing
No idea
Others
